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FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
OVERVIEW

During the past year, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decided numerous federal practice and procedure cases, the majority of which involved
common issues in this area of the law. This brief review of selected cases is
intended to assist the practicing attorney in ascertaining the present status of
certain federal practice and procedure questions and to provide guidance for
further research.
The first part of this article will analyze two decisions which considered
jurisdiction issues. One decision concerns the final judgment rule and the
other decision concerns a unique twist in the diversity requirement for federal jurisdiction. The second part of the article is comprised of a survey of
selected Tenth Circuit decisions in the areas of removal jurisdiction, finality
of interlocutory orders, and review of a master's recommendations.
I.

PRECLUSION OF APPELLATE JURISDICTION BY OPTION JUDGMENTS

By statute, the federal circuit courts are vested with appellate jurisdiction over the final decisions of federal district courts.' The statute does not
define what is "final" for the purpose of appellate jurisdiction. Consequently, the question of finality is often the threshold issue in a case on appeal. Unless a district court judgment is deemed final, an appeal must be
dismissed without considering its merits. The Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit, on its own motion, addressed the issue of finality in McKnney
v. Gannett Co. 2
A.

The FinalJudgment Rule

Although the wording is original, the final judgment rule in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291' has existed in the American judicial system since the Judiciary Act
of 1789. 4 Today, section 1291 allows appeals only from "final decisions." 5
In 1789, when the final judgment rule was enacted under the Judiciary Act,
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982). The statute reads in relevant part: "The courts of appeals
. .. shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United
States . .. except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court." Id.
2. 694 F.2d 1240 (10th Cir. 1982). The issue of appellate jurisdiction may be raised at
any time during the proceedings and, if the parties fail to raise the question, the court has a
duty to determine the issue sua sponte. United States v. Siviglia, 686 F.2d 832, 834-35 (10th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 1902 (1983) (citing Basso v. Utah Power and Light Co.. 495
F.2d 906, 909 (10th Cir. 1974)), quoted in McKinney, 694 F.2d at 1245-46. The lack of a final
judgment in McKtnney was not raised by the parties on appeal. Id.
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982).
4. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 21, 1 Stat. 73, 83-84.
5. See supra note 1. When originally enacted, section 1291 allowed appeals only from
"final judgments or decrees." Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20 § 21, 1 Stat. 73, 83-84. The actual
origin of the final judgment rule is hidden in the obscure history of appellate procedure in
English common law. Crick, The Finaljudgrnent as a Basis for Appeal, 41 YALE L.J. 539, 544
(1932).
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its underlying purpose was to avoid piecemeal reviews. 6 This remains the
primary purpose behind section 1291, although two other policy concerns
now affect the resolution of finality questions. The first, prevention of excessive appeals, evolved after the final judgment rule had been enacted.7 The
second, maintaining the appropriate relationship between the trial and appellate courts, 8 is also of relatively modern origin.
A literal reading of section 1291 suggests strict construction even though
Congress did not define the term "final." 9 Because of the strict construction
suggested by the language of section 1291 and the problems surrounding a
determination of what is "final," the Supreme Court and Congress have created exceptions to the rule. One common exception is the provision for appeals from interlocutory orders, found in 18 U.S.C. § 1292.10 Another
exception is the collateral order doctrine set out in Cohen v. Beneftzial Industrial
Loan Corp. 11 Additionally, to avoid the harshness section 1291 may effect
appellate courts will use the extraordinary writs of mandamus, prohibition,
certiorari, or habeas corpus.12 These exceptions reflect the general recognition among circuit courts that flexibility is appropriate under section 1291.
McKinne , however, creates a limitation upon appellate flexibility by concludiig that certain relief awarded by a triai court prevents a judgment from
becoming a final decision.
6. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 690 (1974); Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion
Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 511 (1950); Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 325 (1940). See also
United States v. Feeney, 641 F.2d 821, 824 (10th Cir. 1981) (quoting Nixon, 418 U.S. at 690).
7. See Crick, supra note 5, at 550-5 1.
8. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 476 (1978) (quoting Parkinson v. April
Industries, Inc., 520 F.2d 650, 654 (2d Cir. 1975)). The phrase "appropriate relationship" refers
to the judicial process of allowing the trial court to fully hear and consider a case without the
appellate court running interference for the litigants by considering every order issued by the
trial court. The trial court's actions are entitled to respect; only upon completion of the entire
trial should the appellate court consider the wisdom of the trial court's actions. See generally
Note, Appealabil'ty in the FederalCourts, 75 HARV. L. REV. 351, 351-52 (1961).
9. A strict construction is suggested because use of the word "final" indicates a congressional intent to maintain an "appropriate relationship" between trial and appellate courts.
10. 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1982). Section 1292 appeals usually concern trial court injunctions,
id § 1292(a)(1), or unsettled questions of law which should be determined to facilitate proper
adjudication on the merits. Id § 1292(b).
11. 337 U.S. 541 (1949). Cohen held that appellate jurisdiction existed for interlocutory
appeals "which finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, [and which are] too important to be denied review and too independent of
the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated." Id at 546. For discussion of a recent Tenth Circuit case, Chavez v. Singer, 698 F.2d 420
(10th Cir. 1983), which addressed the collateral order exception, see in/ra notes 227-237 and
accompanying text.
12. See generally Crick, supra note 5, at 553-54 (general discussion of the purpose and application of each extraordinary writ). An example of the harsh effects of the finality rule is a lower
court order that a litigant's trade secrets are discoverable. The appellate court may grant a writ
of mandamus to consider the propriety of such an order. Set, e.g., Hartley Pen Co. v. United
States District Court, 287 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1961).
The majority in McKinney did not address the harsh effect its dismissal would have on the
litigants. The dissent, however, did consider the issue. 694 F.2d at 1251-52 (Logan, J.,dissenting).
FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b), allowing appeals from orders not dispositive of the entire case, is a
variation of the final judgment rule and not an exception. See nifra notes 234-36 and accompanying text.
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McKinney v. Gannett Co.
1.

The Facts

McKnney v. Gannett Co. 3 arose from a breach of contract action. McKinney and Gannett had entered into an agreement whereby McKinney
agreed to sell his two New Mexico newspaper corporations to Gannett in a
stock-for-stock exchange.1 4 The agreement included a ten-year employment
contract with McKinney which required McKinney to contribute his services to one of the newspaper corporations on the proviso McKinney would
retain editorial control and that Gannett would compensate McKinney for
his services.' 5 After three years, the contractual relationship between the
parties deteriorated and McKinney instigated suit. The grounds for the action were limited by the district court, through pretrial motions and rulings
during trial, to McKinney's claims of breach of contract and fraud, and
Gannett's affirmative defenses of waiver and legal excuse for the alleged
breach of contract. 16
The New Mexico district court eventually considered the case in two
phases. The first phase concerned liability. The liability issues were heard
by a jury which returned special verdicts finding in favor of McKinney on
7
the breach of contract claims and for the defendants on the fraud claim.'
The second phase concerned an accounting required for effecting an equitable rescission. This accounting was ordered following a post-trial hearing at
which McKinney argued that rescission was the only adequate remedy. The
district court agreed, stating that any other relief would be "mere patchwork."" 8 The court added, however, that to ensure Gannett properly managed the papers during the accounting phase, McKinney did not have to
elect rescission until the trial on the accounting was completed.19
Upon completion of the accounting phase of the trial, the district court
entered judgment providing McKinney sixty days from the expiration of the
time to appeal, or sixty days from a Tenth Circuit decision affirming the
20
If Mcjudgment, in which to exercise an option to rescind the contract.
13. 694 F.2d 1240 (10th Cir. 1982).
14. Id. at 1241. "Gannett" refers collectively to Gannett Co. and the two newspapers unless otherwise noted.
15. Id. at 1241-42.
16. Id at 1242. McKinney originally alleged eleven causes of action and sought rescission,
an accounting, and damages. Gannett Co. asserted eight affirmative defenses; in a separate
answer the New Mexican newspapers asserted twenty-six affirmative defenses. Id
17. Id.at 1243.
18. Id.
19. Id. Because the New Mexico newspapers were not fully assimilated into Gannett, an
accounting was proper and, additionally, was necessary to separate the newspapers' books and
profits from Gannett operations.
As noted, the purpose of the option judgment was to ensure that Gannett Co. continued
responsible operation of the newspapers. Id. at 1244. At this point in the proceedings, the
defense attorney questioned whether the option to rescind would be a final judgment from
which an appeal could be taken. Id. at 1245. The district court believed that an option judgment would be final. Id.
20. The option portion of the judgment was worded as follows:
McKinney may exercise the rescission election only during either of the following
periods:
(1) The 60-day period commencing the day following expiration of the time to

DENVER LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 61:2

Kinney failed to exercise this option, the contract would remain in full force
and effect. 2 1 The parties then appealed to the Tenth Circuit.
2.

The Decision

As noted, the Tenth Circuit considered the finality issue on its own motion. 22 The majority held that the district court judgment was not final, and
dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. 23 Judge Logan dis24
sented from this disposition.
McKinney argued that the judgment was final by virtue of the Tenth
Circuit's reasoning in Irwin v. West End Development Co. 25 In Irwin, a constructive trust was imposed over stock to allow the plaintiffs thirty days to
exercise their rights, as shareholders, to purchase a pro-rata share of the
stock. 26 The defendant agrued that the plaintiffs' purchase rights had expired because they failed to exercise those rights within thirty days after the
trial court's entry of judgment. 2 7 The Tenth Circuit held that the appeal
suspended the thirty-day period until the judgment became effective, and
that plaintiffs therefore retained their purchase rights. 28 The issue of final
judgment was not considered.
McKinney argued that there was no meaningful difference between the
stock purchase arrangement in Irwti and the rescission option created in his
case. Both arrangements merely created the right to elect a fixed remedy
29
following appellate consideration of the trial court's rulings.
The McKinney judgment obviously contains an option. The Tenth Circuit, through Judge Barrett, viewed the judgment as terminating only the
liability question, leaving the award of damages unresolved. 30 This form of
judgment, leaving damages unresolved, is not final under section 1291. 3 ' To
appeal, . . . provided that none of the parties to the action has filed a timely notice of
appeal; or
(2) The 60-day period commencing on the date of issuance of a mandate of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirming McKinney's right to
the rescission election.
Id. at 1245 (quoting district court judgment).
21. Id
22. See supra note 2.
23. 694 F.2d at 1249.
24. Id (Logan, J., dissenting).
25. 481 F.2d 34 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. demid, 414 U.S. 1158 (1974).
26. 481 F.2d at 37, 40.
27. Id at 3 9.
28. Id. at 40. The Tenth Circuit held that the option fell within the general rule that an
appeal suspends the time required for performance of an obligation. Id at 39-40.
29. 694 F.2d at 1247. The Irwin judgment provided "[such] tender shall be made within
thirty days from the date this judgment becomes final, and, if such tender is not made, the trust
hereby impressed shall be released." Id. at 1250 (Logan, J., dissenting).
30. 694 F.2d at 1246.
31. Id The Supreme Court has held:
The order, viewed apart from its discussion of Rule 54(b), constitutes a grant of partial
summary judgment limited to the issue of petitioner's liability. Such judgments are by
their terms interlocutory, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56(c), and where assessment of damages or awarding of other relief remains to be resolved have never been considered to
be "final" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737, 744 (1976), quoted in McKinney, 694 F.2d at
1246.
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have the appellate court consider the case before a decision on damages disturbs the appropriate relationship by placing the appellate court in the trial
process.
Besides relying on the form of the judgment in reaching its conclusion
on lack of finality, the Tenth Circuit also drew upon the final judgment
definition articulated in Cathn o. United States. 32 In Cat/in, the Supreme
Court held that a final judgment is one that "end[s] the litigation on the
' 33
merits and leave[s] nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.
The option judgment in McKinney required more than the mere execution of
judgment, because execution of the district court judgment was dependent
on McKinney's decision to rescind. Therefore, under Cal/in, the trial court's
order was not a final decision. 34
A further factor militating against finding a final decision was the possibility of rendering an advisory opinion. Even though the parties' rights and
liabilities had been adjudicated, to have the Tenth Circuit consider the mer35
its would place the court in the position of rendering an advisory opinion.
The advisory opinion was possible because the majority interpreted the trial
court's judgment as a "second . . . option to rescind,following our opinion on
the merits."' 36 Essentially, McKinney's decision would be based on the appellate treatment of alleged errors in the accounting, rather than the trial
37
court's findings in the accounting proceeding.
The majority opinion dismissed McKinney's analogy to Irwin v. West
End Development Co. 38 by distinguishing Irwin. According to the majority, the
Irwin judgment required plaintiffs to tender money for stock. 39 Therefore, it
contained no option similar to that present in McKinney. 40
Judge Breitenstein concurred in Judge Barrett's majority opinion, but
distinguished Irwin on different grounds. Irwin involved equitable relief essentially forcing performance of a contractually created stock purchase option. 41 McKinney involved a judicially created option which would allow the
plaintiff to choose one of two forms of relief after an appellate decision had
settled certain issues affecting the relative worth of each option. 42 Essentially, the McKinney option allowed the plaintiff to obtain judicial advice on
the effect of a particular election, thereby allowing an improper exercise of
32. 324 U.S. 229 (1945).
33. Id at 233, quotedzn McKinney, 694 F.2d at 1247.
34. 694 F.2d at 1248. Cf Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Frontier Airlines,
Inc., No. 82-1404 (10th Cir., Dec. 8, 1982) (district court approval of settlement agreement not
final inasmuch as a defendant could opt out of the agreement).
35. It is axiomatic that federal courts cannot render advisory opinions. E.g., Norvell v.
Sangre de Cristo Dev. Co., 519 F.2d 370 (10th Cir. 1975).
36. 694 F.2d at 1249 (emphasis in original).
37. Id. The merits of the appeal involved tax questions and challenges to the accuracy of
accounting; deciding those issues would have helped McKinney choose the most advantageous
option. Id
38. 481 F.2d 34 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1158 (1974).
39. Id. The majority's characterization of the Irwin judgment order appears inaccurate. See
supra note 29.
40. 694 F.2d at 1247.
41. Id at 1249 (Breitenstein, J., concurring). See Irwin, 481 F.2d at 37-41.
42. 694 F.2d at 1249.
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43

The Dissent

Pointing first to the equitable motivation for the option,4 4 and second
to the fact that McKinney had no remedial option-he could either accept
rescission or forego all relief whatsoever 4 5-the
dissent found the relief
4 6
granted was an appropriate exercise of the trial court's equitable power.
The dissent also found support for its position in Irwzn's failure to consider
the finality of the shareholders' option, which, for Judge Logan, was essentially identical to McKinney's option. 47 This failure indicated the routine
48
nature of judgments granting optional relief.
Judge Logan also rejected the majority's reliance on Cat/hn. The only
action required of the trial court was entry of McKinney's election, and
modifications in the accounting ordered by the court of appeals. Thus, the
judgment was final under Catln.
Next, the dissent pointed to the general rule that a judgment should be
given a practical rather than a technical construction when considering
finality. 4 9 The Tenth Circuit could have entertained the appeal to advance
final judgment policies: trial proceedings would not be interfered with because the trial was over for all practical purposes; costs and piecemeal appeals would be avoided because remanding would allow interlocutory
appeals pursuant to the certification provision in section 1292; and judicial
efficiency would be promoted. 50 Also, because the legal issues had been decided by the lower court and the option was designed to encourage responsible action by Gannett, a remand would impose undue and unjustified
hardship on the parties. 5 1 Judge Logan concluded by stating that he could
not "accept the view that because litigants may abandon rights reduced to
judgment the judgment is advisory"; accordingly, he would have addressed
52
the appeal on the merits.
C. Judic'al Discretion and Final Dectstons
The only Supreme Court construction of the meaning of "final decision" was in Catl'n, where the Court held that the primary indicium of final43. Id.
44. Id at 1250 (Logan, J., dissenting).
45. Id See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
46. 694 F.2d at 1250 (Logan, J., dissenting).
47. Judge Logan observed that the hwin judgment did not requirte any action by the plaintiffs, notwithstanding the majority's interpretation of the terms of the judgment. Id (quoting
Irwin judgment).
48. Id
49. E.g., Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152 (1964); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545 (1949). The dissent claimed the majority's opinion
was merely a technical decision because, practically, the case was ripe for appeal. All the legal
issues had been developed and decided. The contingency judgment was merely an equitable
device that should not defeat the appeal. 694 F.2d at 1251 (Logan, J., dissenting).
50. 694 F.2d at 1251 (Logan,J., dissenting). See generally Andre, The Finaljudgment Rule and
Party Appeals of Civil Contempt Orders. Time_/or a Change, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1041, 1061 (1980).
51. 694 F.2d at 1252 (Logan, J., dissenting).
52. Id
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ity was termination of a trial court's adjudicative function. 53 The Supreme
Court has since acknowledged that this definition has not provided a
formula through which a final judgment can be pinpointed. 54 Thus, as predicted in an early critique of the final judgment rule,55 a large volume of
litigation has evolved around the question of what constitutes a final
decision.
In light of the inadequate Cat/hn definition, courts often invoke a balancing test. Although the ultimate purpose of the final decision rule is to
have one review over all stages of the proceeding, 56 courts must balance
avoidance of piecemeal review against delay which will cause a denial of
justice.57 Thus, fairness to litigants is not sacrificed merely because the presence of a final judgment is arguable. This balancing approach, however,
still fails to create a clear formula for determining what constitutes a final
judgment.
In Gillespie v. United Slates Steel Corp. ,58 Justice Black recognized that a
decision on whether a judgment is final can often be supported equally
either way. 5 9 The decision in McKinney illustrates Justice Black's assertion,
and also demonstrates the significant discretionary power of an appellate
court to determine finality.
The majority in McKinney strictly followed the Catlin definition. The
trial court could not simply execute judgment because it was required to
wait for McKinney's decision on the option. Because that decision would
occur after the appeal, the majority refused to treat the trial court's order as
a final decision; to do so would involve the appellate court in the trial process. Further, McKinney would have benefitted from an appellate decision
on the merits of the appeal. 60 Thus, on balance, the competing policy factors weighed against assuming jurisdiction. 61 The dissent focused on the
negative effects of refusing jurisdiction to a decision which had eliminated all
the trial court's adjudicatory functions. 62 By remanding the case, the parties
would incur considerable hardship, and interlocutory appeal possibilities
would contribute to judicial inefficiency. 63 Therefore, the competing policy
concerns weighed in favor of accepting jurisdiction. In essence, the judges,
53. Catlin, 324 U.S. at 233 ("A 'final decision' generally is one which ends the litigation on
the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.")
54. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 170 (1974).
55. Crick, supra note 5, at 558.
56. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546.
57. See, e.g., Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507 (1950). See generally
Andre, supra note 50, at 1042. Judge Logan considered this balancing approach in MlfcKznm,.
See 694 F.2d at 1251 (Logan, J., dissenting).
58. 379 U.S. 148 (1964).
59. Justice Black stated: "[w]hether a ruling is 'final' within the meaning of § 1291 is
frequently so close a question that decision of that issue either way can be supported with
equally forceful arguments.
Id. at 152.
60. 694 F.2d at 1249.
61. Although the majority's analysis does not explicitly weigh competing policy concerns,
this conclusion is implicit in its rejection of a decision which was final for all practical purposes.
See supra notes 44-52 and accompanying text.
62. See supra text accompanying notes 50-51.
63. 694 F.2d at 1250 (Logan, J., dissenting).
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in keeping with the practice of other circuit courts, 64 were using their discretion in determining whether the trial court's order was a final decision.
Fifty years ago one commentator concluded that without a definite
formula for identifying a final judgment, section 1291 was useless. 65 A satisfactory definition must establish a definite point in a trial court proceeding
which can be labeled as final; only when that point is reached could an
appeal be taken. 66 As the Supreme Court has recognized, the Cat/in definition is not dispositive. Instead of perfecting the definition, appellate courts
continue to emphasize various purposes and policies in determining what is
a final judgment. 67 Unfortunately, all the Tenth Circuit determined in McKnney was that a certain form of judgment is not a final decision under
section 1291. The holding does nothing to clear the fog emanating from the
Cat/n definition.
Section 1291 is important because it avoids disruption and delay of legitimate court functions and minimizes the strain on the parties and the
judicial system forseeable in a system sending all trial court orders through
the appeal process. 68 As McKznney illustrates, however, in many cases courts
are using their discretion in determining what constitutes a final decision
under section 1291. Although the purposes behind section 1291 are important and must be effected, as it stands section 1291 generates as much labor
as it saves. 69 Instead of requiring courts to rationalize their decisions, section
1291 should be repealed. 70 Appellate courts would then be left in their present position of applying discretion based on court-made policies, but would
be able to develop a more disciplined set of criteria for determining finality.
The proposed repeal of section 1291 should not be equated with ignoring the judicial policy of avoiding piecemeal reviews, however. That policy,
along with the policies of preventing excessive appeals, maintaining an appropriate relationship with the trial court, and avoiding undue hardship,
must continue to serve as the guidelines for determining the scope of appellate jurisdiction.
64. See, e.g., In re Continental Inv. Corp., 637 F.2d I (1st Cir. 1980); In re Berkley & Co.,
629 F.2d 548 (8th Cir. 1980); Dilly v. S.S. Kresge Co., 606 F.2d 62 (4th Cir. 1979); Ryan v.
Occidental Petroleum Corp., 577 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1978); David v. Hooker, Ltd., 560 F.2d 412
(9th Cir. 1977); West v. Capitol Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 558 F.2d 977 (10th Cir. 1977); Kappelmann v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 539 F.2d 165 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1061
(1977).
65. Crick, supra note 5, at 563-65.
66. See id at 558.
67. Cf Mercantile Nat'l Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555, 575 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("The Court's decision in these appeals throws the law of finality into a state of great
uncertainty and will, I am afraid, tend to increase further efforts at piecemeal review.").
68. See Andre, supra note 50, at 1061.
69. See Crick, supra note 5, at 562.
70. Cf Crick, supra note 5, at 564-65 (proposing repeal of statutory limits on appellate
jurisdiction in favor of appellate discretion in order to effect a more meaningful appellate
review).
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HARRIS V. ILLINOIS-CALIFORNIA EXPRESS, INC.: APPLYING THE
REQUIREMENT OF COMPLETE DIVERSITY

A.

Overview of Dversi' Jurisdiction
71

It is fundamental that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.
Federal jurisdiction is limited both by the provisions of article 11172 and by
the acts of Congress. 73 One such limitation is the diversity requirement,
which permits actions normally within state court jurisdiction to be brought
74
in federal court when the adverse parties are citizens of different states.
Supreme Court interpretations of the current diversity jurisdiction statute
have held that if any adverse parties are citizens of the same state, diversity
jurisdiction does not exist. 75 Historically, an exception to this statutory requirement of complete diversity has been recognized where complete diversity is lost through events taking place after a federal court properly had
jurisdiction. In that circumstance, the Court has recognized the continued
76
Harris v. I/linois-CaformiaExpress, Inc. 77
presence of diversity jurisdiction.
required the Tenth Circuit to consider whether diversity jurisdiction existed
following a series of procedural events, detailed below, which resulted in a
loss of complete diversity.
B.

Harris v. Illinois-California Express, Inc.
1. The Facts

Harris was a personal injury action arising from an automobile accident
which took place in New Mexico. Kimberly Harris, a passenger in the car of
Sherry and William Harden, commenced an action against the drivers, owners, and insurers of the other vehicles involved in the accident. 78 The action
was filed in the federal district court for New Mexico, with jurisdiction based
on complete diversity between Harris and the defendants. 79 The defendants
71. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803). Accord Owen Equip. & Erection
Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 372 (1978).
72. U.S. CONST., art. III.
73. Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441
(1850).
74. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (1982) provides: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000,
exclusive of interest and costs, and is between-(l) citizens of different states." See also U.S.
CONST., art. III, § 2, cl. 7. The primary purpose of diversity jurisdiction is to protect out-ofstate citizens from the prejudice of local courts, or at least to alleviate the fear of such prejudice.
See Bank of United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 87 (1809). Other justifications for
diversity range from the supposed procedural advantages existing in federal court to the invigorating effect an available federal forum has on inter-regional capital flows. See generally C.
WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 134-36 (1983).
75. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530-31 (1967). Accord Owen
Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 373 & n,13 (1978); Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7
U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
76. See Wichita R.R. & Light Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 260 U.S. 48 (1922); see generally
D. CURRIE, FEDERAL COURTS 303 (1982).
77. 687 F.2d 1361 (10th Cir. 1982).
78. Id. at 1364. Harris sued individually and as a personal representative of her husband's
estate. Her husband was a passenger and died in the accident.
79. Id
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subsequently filed a third-party complaint against William Harden. 80 Following this complaint, Sherry Harden filed a motion requesting permission
to intervene as a co-party plaintiff against the defendants named in Harris'
original complaint, which motion was granted. 8 1 Sherry's intervention did
not affect jurisdiction; complete diversity remained between all plaintiffs and
defendants in Harris' original suit. 8 2 Next, however, Harris amended her
complaint to include William Harden as a defendant. 8 3 Sherry Harden did
not assert any claims against William. 8 4 Nonetheless, because both Hardens
had identical state citizenship, William's addition as a defendant destroyed
complete diversity; citizens of the same state were then on opposite sides of
the same action. 8 5 After trial on the merits the defendants appealed, raising
the question of diversity jurisdiction.86
2.

The Decision

The Tenth Circuit began by observing that complete diversity existed
at the time of Harris' original complaint, remained after Sherry Harden intervened as a plaintiff, and was only lost when William Harden was joined
as a defendant by Harris' amended complaint. 87 The Tenth Circuit held,
however, that Harris's addition of William did not violate the complete diversity rule. 88 This holding stemmed from the court's statement that once
diversity jurisdiction has properly attached, jurisdiction is not destroyed by
the permissive intervention of a non-indispensable party, especially where
that party has independent grounds for jurisdiction. 8 9 The court rejected
defendants' argument that Sherry Harden was an indispensable party. Although the claims of Harris and Sherry Harden had questions of law and
fact in common, the actions were independent of each other and could be
treated separately. 9° Because Sherry was not an essential party, her intervention could not defeat diversity jurisdiction. 9 '
The Tenth Circuit then considered William Harden's position in the
80. Id. William Harden filed cross-claims against the defendants as third-party plaintiffs.
Id
81. Id at 1364-65.
82. Id at 1365.
83. Id Harris and William Harden had different state citizenships.
84. Ila.
85. Id At the district court level the defendants moved to dismiss for lack of diversity
jurisdiction, but withdrew the motion. Id
86. d Plaintiffs prevailed at trial. Id at 1364.
87. Id at 1366.
88. Id at 1369.
89. Id at 1367. This principle is grounded in the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction, which
permits a court to exercise judicial power over a group of related claims once jurisdiction exists
over the original claim. See D. CURRIE, supra note 76, at 303. Limits on ancillary jurisdiction
exist, see Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978), although those limits
have yet to be defined. See D. CURRIE, supra note 76, at 304. See also infra notes 99-143 and
accompanying text.
90. 687 F.2d at 1368. The court also noted that Sherry's intervention did not, in itself,
destroy diversity jurisdiction. The Tenth Circuit analogized this situation to a consolidation of
actions under FED. R. Civ. P. 42. If the two actions had been commenced independently, they
would have been consolidated for judicial economy. Therefore, jurisdiction should be maintained. See 687 F.2d at 1368-69.
91. Id. (quoting Wihta R.R. &Light Co. v. Pub/ic UJtZ Comm'n, 260 U.S. 51, 53-54 (1922)).
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action. Although Harris' amended complaint joining William Harden as a
defendant destroyed complete diversity, like Sherry, William was not an essential party. 92 Therefore, William's addition, like Sherry's, could not divest
93
the court of jurisdiction.
The conclusion to recognize jurisdiction was buttressed by citation to
the Supreme Court's decision in Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger.94
Owen rejected the argument that diversity jurisdiction remained after all diverse defendants had been dismissed from plaintiffs case, even though diversity jurisdiction had originally been present. 95 Crucial to the decision,
however, was the fact that the plaintiff in Owen could not have sued the
remaining defendant under the diversity provisions. 9 6 The Supreme Court
recognized that the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction, although flexible,
could not be used to create jurisdiction over a suit so obviously in contravention of the statutory diversity requirement. 97 The Tenth Circuit, emphasizing Owen's recognition of the benefits of flexibility in construing a court's
ancillary jurisdiction powers, 98 upheld jurisdiction in Harris notwithstanding
the lack of complete diversity.
C.

The Tenth Circui Loses Itself in Court-Made Rules

Diversity jurisdiction is determined at the time an action is commenced
and at every stage of the proceeding. 99 This jurisdiction cannot be enlarged
or limited by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.' 0 0 Pursuant to Rule
14(a),' 0 1 the defendants named in Harris' original complaint impleaded
William Harden as a third-party defendant.' 0 2 By so doing, the district
court acquired jurisdiction over Mr. Harden. Because impleader is a defensive weapon, which ensures that a defendant's interests are adequately pro92. 687 F.2d at 1368-69.
93. See id at 1368-69.
94. 437 U.S. 365 (1978).
95. Id. at 377.
96. See id.
97. d
98. 687 F.2d at 1369.
99. See, e.g., Treines v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66 (1939). In certain circumstances,
once diversity jurisdiction is held to exist subsequent changes in the status of the original parties
will not divest a court's jurisdiction. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283
(1938) (diversity jurisdiction not ousted by plaintiff's subsequent lowering of claimed damages);
Koenigsberger v. Richmond Silver Mining Co., 158 U.S. 41 (1895) (subsequent change in a
party's citizenship will not destroy diversity jurisdiction). Cf also Hill v. Rolleri, 615 F.2d 886
(9th Cir, 1980) (court maintained jurisdiction over non-diverse third-party claim after dismissal
of diverse plaintiff because diversity was present at time action commenced, and subsequent
events would not defeat jurisdiction).
100. FED. R. Civ. P. 82 provides in part that "[t]hese rules shall not be construed to extend
or limit the jurisdiction of the United States district courts."
101. FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a). This rule provides in part:
At any time after commencement of the action a defending party as a third-party
plaintiff may cause a summons and complaint to be served upon a person not a party
to the action who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff's claim
against him . . . . The plaintiff may assert any claim against the third-party defendant arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiff's claim against the third-party plaintiff . ...
Id.
102. 687 F.2d at 1364.
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tected, no independent jurisdictional grounds need to be asserted by the
impleading defendant.' 3 Jurisdiction over an impleaded defendant exists
by virtue of a federal court's power to hear claims ancillary to the primary
action. 104
Rule 14(a) also permits the original plaintiff to assert claims directly
against a third-party defendant. 105 Because Rule 14(a) is not jurisdictional,1 0 6 confusion has arisen as to when independent grounds for jurisdiction are necessary for a plaintiff asserting claims directly against a thirdparty defendant. This section will attempt to sort out some of that
confusion.
In 1978, the Supreme Court concluded that independent jurisdictional
grounds must be present for a diversity plaintiff to assert a claim directly
against a third-party defendant. 10 7 The Supreme Court's decision, Owen
Equipment & Erectton Co. v. Kroger,' 0 8 involved diversity action in which the
plaintiff amended her complaint to assert a claim against a non-diverse
third-party defendant. 10 9 The primary diverse defendant was dismissed
from the action," 0 and the Supreme Court held that jurisdiction was lost
over the remaining claim in the absence of an independent basis for federal
jurisdiction. '" Although Kroger reemphasizes strict construction of the diversity requirement,'1 2 its actual holding is limited to the factual situation in
3
which the plaintiff and the third-party defendant are non-diverse."1
The lower courts in Kroger would have retained the action under the
doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction.' 14 Discussing the scope of ancillary jurisdiction' t 5 in light of the federal diversity requirements, the Court observed
103. Northern Contracting Co. v. C.J. Langenfelder & Son, Inc., 439 F. Supp. 621, 624
(ED. Pa. 1977); see also James Talcott, Inc. v. Allahabad Bank Ltd., 444 F.2d 451 (5th Cir.
1971); Dery v. Wyer, 265 F.2d 804 (2d Cir. 1959).
104. Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 375 n.18 (1978).
105. See supra note 101.
106. See supra note 100.
107. See Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978).
108. 437 U.S. 365 (1978).
109. See id. at 368-69.
110. Id at 368.
111. Id. at 370, 377.
112. See id at 377. The rule of complete diversity reaffirmed in Kroger requires every plaintiff in a diversity action to have a state citizenship different from every defendant. Hlarts, 687
F.2d at 1366 (quoting Kroger, 437 U.S. at 377). See also Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3
Cranch) 267 (1806); Oppenheim v. Sterling, 368 F.2d 516 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1011
(1966).
113. See infra notes 114-18 and accompanying text. The Fifth Circuit has held that Kroger
holds that "an independent basis of jurisdiction is necessary for a plaintiff in a diversity action
to assert a non-federal claim against a non-diverse third-party defendant." Birmingham Fire
Ins. Co. v. Winegardner & Hammons, Inc., 714 F.2d 548, 553-54 (5th Cir. 1983) (quoting
Fauvor v. Texaco, Inc., 546 F.2d 636, 643 (5th Cir. 1977)).
114. 437 U.S. at 367. The court of appeals held that the district court had discretion over
whether it should adjudicate the non-diverse claim because, under United Mine Workers v.
Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1976), the plaintiff's claim against the third-party defendant derived from
the same "core of operative facts" as the main action. 437 U.S. at 369.
115. The distinctions in applying pendant and ancillary jurisdictions are fading into one
indistinguishable doctrine. See general'y Comment, Pendant and Anci11a, Jurtsdction.- Towards a
Synthesis of Two Doctrines, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1263, 1273 (1975). In Kroger, the Supreme Court,
without attempting to distinguish between ancillary and pendant jurisdiction, 437 U.S. at 370
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that if the plaintiff was allowed to assert her claim against the non-diverse
third party, the diversity requirement would be circumvented.' 16 To prevent such an occurrence, the Supreme Court set forth three criteria for ancillary jurisdiction. Besides the requirement of a "common nucleus of
operative fact" enunciated in UnitedMne Workers v. Gibbs,'1 7 the Court added that consideration should be given to the context in which the nonfederal claim is propounded, and that consideration should be given to
maintaining the integrity of the statute bestowing jurisdiction over the original claim.18 Noting that ancillary jurisdiction normally is a defensive
weapon used by defendants, 1 9 and applying the three criteria to the facts in
Kroger, the Supreme Court prohibited the offensive use of ancillary jurisdiction by the plaintiff in a diversity action.
The Tenth Circuit did not discuss the initial propriety of Harris'
amended complaint including William Harden as a defendant. Instead, the
court was concerned solely with whether Mr. Harden was an indispensable
party.' 20 Although Judge Barrett failed to discuss Harris's amendment
under the three criteria set out in Kroger, the complaint satisfies those criteria
and, therefore, is not in conflict with Kroger's prohibition against the offensive use of ancillary jurisdiction. First, Harris' direct claim against William
Harden as third-party defendant obviously arose from the same core of operative fact, 12 1 and is a claim which Harris would expect to try with her other
claims in one judicial proceeding.' 22 Second, the posture in which Harris'
amended complaint comes about is important on two points. To begin with,
unlike the defendant in Aldinger v. Howard12 3 Mr. Harden was already a
party to the action and within the court's jurisdiction. Harris' amended
complaint therefore does not raise the problems associated with a plaintiff's
n.8, recognized that ancillary jurisdiction is clearly proper with respect to impleader, crossclaims, and counter-claims. Id. at 375 & n.18.
116. "[A] plaintiff could defeat the statutory requirement of complete diversity by the simple expedient of suing only those defendants who were of diverse citizenship and waiting for
them to implead nondiverse defendants." 437 U.S. at 374.
117. 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
118. Id. at 373 (citing Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 18 (1976)). The three factors articulated in Kroger have been applied in subsequent ancillary jurisdiction cases. E.g., Travelers Ins.
Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 675 F.2d 633, 638-40 (5th Cir. 1982) (held no ancillary jurisdiction over
cross-claims of non-diverse parties in an interpleader action); Acton Co. v. Bachman Foods, Inc.,
668 F.2d 76, 79-80 (1st Cir. 1982) (held no ancillary jurisdiction over joinder of non-diverse
plaintiff); Gunnell v. Amoco Oil Co., 490 F. Supp. 67, 69 (W.D. Mich. 1980) (held no ancillary
jurisdiction over plaintiffs claim against a non-diverse third-party defendant). See also Runyan
v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 566 F. Supp. 600 (D. Colo. 1983) (applied Kroger's requirements
to prohibit pendant jurisdiction over a state claim).
119. 437 U.S. at 376. Ancillary jurisdiction is "defensive" because it is a way for defendants,
brought into court against their will, to protect their interests by asserting claims against the
plaintiff or other responsible parties. Id ; see also Acton Co. v. Bachman Foods, Inc., 668 F.2d
76, 79 (1st Cir. 1982); Comment, supra note 115, at 1273. Justice White dissented from Kroger's
defensive classification of ancillary jurisdiction. Kroger, 437 U.S. at 381 (White, J., dissenting).
Justice White would have followed Gibbs, and held that a common nucleus of operative fact is
sufficient for jurisdiction over all claims arising in a diversity case. Id. at 384.
120. 687 F.2d at 1368-69. The Tenth Circuit ultimately held that Mr. Harden was not a
necessary party to Kimberly Harris' action.
121. See id. at 1364-65.

122. See Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725.
123. 472 U.S. 1 (1976). The Supreme Court in Aldinger held that a federal court does not
have pendant party jurisdiction over a defendant sued solely on a state claim.
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attempt to add a new party to the action.' 24 Next, unlike Kroger, Harris and
William Harden were diverse parties, so that Harris could have maintained
an independent action against Mr. Harden in federal court. 12 5 Finally, the
independent jurisdictional basis upon which Harris could amend her complaint to include a claim against William Harden ensures the integrity of the
diversity jurisdiction statute. Harris' use of Rule 14(a) did not expand the
Tenth Circuit's limited jurisdiction; hence, her action against Harden is permissible under Kroger.
Sherry Harden's effect on diversity, as a result of Sherry's intervention,
is not necessarily determinative for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. When
a party seeks to intervene in a lawsuit, several considerations are implicated.
First, it must be determined whether the party seeking intervention is an
indispensable party under Rule 19.126 The Tenth Circuit correctly held that
Sherry was not an indispensable party.' 2 7 After determining that an intervenor such as Sherry is not an indispensable party, the propriety of permissive intervention must be considered. Two requirements must be met for
permissive intervention under Rule 24(b).' 22 First, the intervenor must have
a question of law or fact in common with the pending action.' 29 Second, the
0
intervening party must have independent grounds for federal jurisdiction. 13
Sherry Harden met both requirements. 13 ' When a party is not indispensable and meets the criteria for permissive intervention, diversity jurisdiction
under 18 U.S.C. § 1332(a) 132 is not destroyed.' 33 Therefore, Sherry's presence as a permissive intervenor did not have to be considered when Harris'
complaint was amended to include William Harden as a defendant.
124. See id at 14-15. Aldnger distinguished between the situation where a plaintiff seeks to
assert a claim against one already present under federal jurisdiction and a plaintiff's attempt to
join an entirely new defendant without an independent basis ofjurisdiction. In the latter situation, the federal court would lack jurisdiction. Id. See Kroger, 437 U.S. at 381-82 (White, J.,
dissenting) (noting this significant distinction involving context). Moreover, the Aldnger holding was limited to the plaintiff's specific claim pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1982) and 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. V 1981). The Court recognized that different party alignments and different jurisdictional statutes could permit a different result. 427 U.S. at 18.
125. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982) (providing a federal jurisdiction for diversity actions). This
aspect of the case negates the Supreme Court's fear in Kroger that a plaintiff could sue only
diverse citizenship defendants and wait for the defendants to implead non-diverse defendants.
See supra note 116.
126. FED. R. Civ. P. 19. This rule sets out the requirements for classification as an indispensable party.
127. See 689 F.2d at 1367.
128. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(b).
129. "[A]nyone may be permitted to intervene in an action ...
(2) when an applicant's
claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or fact in common." Id.
130. 687 F.2d at 1367; Miller & Miller Auctioneers, Inc. v. G.W. Murphy Indus., Inc., 472
F.2d 893, 528, 530 (10th Cir. 1973) (permissive intervention denied because no independent
grounds for jurisdiction). When the intervening party does not have independent jurisdictional
grounds, the intervenor must meet Rule 24's requirements for intervention by right.
131. Sherry had questions of law and fact in common with Harris, and diversity jurisdiction
was present between Sherry and the original defendants. 687 F.2d at 1367.
132. 18 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1982).
133. Miller v. Miller, 406 F.2d 590, 593 (10th Cir. 1969) ("Executors are not indispensable
parties in actions such as this and therefore the intervention of such a party cannot destroy
diversity jurisdiction."); Drillers Engine & Supply, Inc. v. Burckhalter, 327 F. Supp. 648, 649-50
(W.D. Okla. 1971) (non-indispensable parties do not defeat the court's diversity jurisdiction
over the main action).
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The above reasoning appears to have been followed by the Tenth Circuit, 134 but parts of Judge Barrett's analysis fail to articulate the interaction
between Rule 19(a), Rule 24(b), and section 1332(a). At the outset, the
Tenth Circuit's emphasis on the fact that Sherry intervened prior to Harris'
amended complaint 135 is misplaced. Regardless of when permissive intervention is sought, it is within the court's discretion to allow intervention if
the party is not indispensable and the criteria behind Rule 24(b) are met.136
Because diversity jurisdiction over the main action is not affected by such a
137
party, it does not matter when the party seeks to intervene.
Another aspect of Hams indicating the court's failure to focus on the
relevant rules is its quote from Wzchila Railroad& Light Co. v. Pubic Uihties
Commission.' 31 Wichit'a Railroad involved the permissive intervention of a
non-diverse party as a defendant. 139 In that case, the Supreme Court held
jurisdiction was not divested.1 40 The Tenth Circuit unfortunately did not
distinguish Wichita Railroad, which did not involve Rule 24(b) and which
does not support the Tenth Circuit's statement that Sherry Harden could
not have intervened if Harris had amended her complaint first. 14 ' Finally,
the discussion of consolation 142 seems to be a weak effort to bolster the Tenth
Circuit's holding, and suggests that the court may have been uneasy with its
own reasoning and with reliance on Rule 24(b).
Although the court's conclusion in Harris is correct under the criteria set
out in Kroger, the Tenth Circuit's reasoning relies on undisciplined arguments and fails to note factual distinctions in relevant precedents. Kroger did
134. See 687 F.2d at 1367-68.
135. See id. at 1368.
136. See supra notes 126-33 and accompanying text; cf Drillers Engine & Supply, Inc. v.
Burckhalter, 327 F. Supp. 648, 649 (W.D. Okla. 1971) (pointing out that non-diverse parties did
not assert claims against each other but were asserting their own claims independently).
137. See supra note 132 and accompanying text. The Tenth Circuit implicitly recognized
this point when it discussed whether William Harden was an indispensable party. See 687 F.2d
at 1369.
138. 260 U.S. 48 (1922). Harris quoted the following passage from Wichita Railroad:
The intervention of the Kansas Company, a citizen of the same State as the
Wichita Company, its opponent, did not take away the ground of diverse citizenship.
That ground existed when the suit was begun and the plaintiff set it forth in the bill as
a matter entitling it to go into the District Court. Jurisdiction once acquired on that
ground is not divested by a subsequent change in the citizenship of the parties ....
Much less is such jurisdiction defeated by the intervention, by leave of the court, of a
party whose presence is not essential to a decision of the controversy between the original parties . . . . The Kansas Company, while it had an interest and was a proper
party, was not an indispensable party.
687 F.2d at 1368 (quoting Witchila Railroad, 260 U.S. at 53-54).
139. 260 U.S. at 52-53. This case illustrates the defensive use of ancillary Jurisdiction. rather
than the offensive use prohibited by the Supreme Court in Kroger. Such a factual difference
surrounding the non-diversity claim is perhaps the material reason why Kroger did not overrule
Wichita Railroad. In Wichita Railroad a defendant benefited, whereas in Kroger it would have
been the plaintiff who benefited.
140. Id. at 54.
141. See 687 F.2d at 1368. Specificially, there were no independent jurisdictional grounds in
Wichita Railroad. 260 U.S. at 52. In fact, the Wichita Railroad quote supports the conclusion that
Sherry Harden could have intervened after William Harden had been joined as a direct defendant by Harris.
142. See 687 F.2d at 1368-69 (distinguishing Kroger from consolidation actions under FED.
R. Civ. P. 42).
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not eliminate the possibility of avoiding complete diversity. It is a significant
decision in the diversity area and should not be tossed aside unnoticed, as the
Tenth Circuit seemed to do in Harris. Reaching the proper result through
the misapplication of Kroger and Wichita Railroad leaves Harris a bewildering
43
and confusing precedent.1
III.

REMOVAL JURISDICTION

Removal refers to the right to transfer an action from a state court,
where it was originally filed, to a federal court. Removal is permitted when
the federal court would have had original jurisidiction over the action. 144
This right has existed as a valid statutory procedure since the Judiciary Act
of 1789.145 The purposes behind the removal statute are to escape local
prejudice towards nonresident litigants and to provide an appropriate forum
46
for actions involving federal law which have been brought in state court. 1
The construction and effect of the removal statute was the subject of several
Tenth Circuit decisions this past term.
A.

Defect in Stale JurisdictionNot Cured by Removal

Jurisdiction upon removal is derivative, meaning that when a state
court has no jurisdiction over a claim, a federal court acquires none on removal and must dismiss the case. 14 7 This is true even if jurisdiction would
have been proper had the suit originally been filed in a federal court. 148 The
Tenth Circuit, in Goodrich v. Burlngton Northern Railroad,14 9 reinforced the rule
that where a state court does not have jurisdiction over a particular claim,
proper removal to a federal court will not cure the defect regardless of considerations of judicial economy.
Goodrich was a negligence action originally brought in a Colorado state
court. The defendant, Burlington Northern Railroad (Burlington), impleaded the United States Postal Service (United States), asserting claims for
143. Harris is another example of the judicial energy wasted on the diversity requirement,
and lends support for abolishing diversity jurisdiction. See generally Rowe, Abolishing Dzversiy
Juridiction."Positive Side Efecs and Poienialfor FurtherReforns, 92 HARv. L. REV. 963 (1979).
144. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1982). This section states:
Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action
brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original
jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court
of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.
Id.
145. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 12; 1 Stat. 73, 79. For a brief history of the removal
statutes, see Note, Remand OrderReview After Thermtron Products, 1977 U. ILL. L. F. 1086, 108891.
146. Myers, FederalAppellate Revtew of Remand Orders.- Expanstn or Eradcaion? 48 Miss. L.J.
741, 741 (1977).
147. Arizona v. Manypenny, 451 U.S. 232, 242 & n.17 (1981). The dismissal is based on
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Venner v. Michigan Central R.R., 271 U.S. 127, 131 (1926);
accord Washington v. American League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 460 F.2d 654 (9th Cir.
1972); Martinez v. Seaton, 285 F.2d 587 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 946 (1961). See also
Montgomery v. Utah, No. 82-2194 (10th Cir., Feb. 28, 1983) (removal jurisdiction dependent
upon a viable state action).
148. Arizona v. Manypenny, 451 U.S. 232, 242 n.17 (1981).
149. 701 F.2d 129 (10th Cir. 1983).
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contribution and indemnity under the Federal Tort Claims Act. 150 The
United States successfully removed the case to federal court., 5 ' Once in federal court, the United States pointed out that exclusive jurisdiction over
claims asserted under the Federal Tort Claims Act rests with the federal
district courts. 152 The state court therefore had no jurisdiction over the
third party claim, with the result that the federal district court had no derivative jurisdiction. 3 The district court agreed, and dismissed the thirdparty claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 154 The propriety of the
dismissal was appealed to the Tenth Circuit.
On appeal, Burlington asserted that the federal district court erred in
granting the dismissal because such a ruling, based on the derivative jurisdiction principle, frustrated judicial economy. 155 Judge Seymour, writing
for the Tenth Circuit, considered the impleader rule 156 and its purpose of
judicial economy, and stated that the derivative jurisdictional principle
nonetheless applied to third-party claims. 157 Judge Seymour followed Kenrose
Manufacturing Co. v.Fred Whitaker Co. ,'15a Fourth Circuit decision which
held that mere permission in the federal rules to bring a claim does not con15 9
fer jurisdiction over a claim.
The application of Kenrose Manufacturing in Goodrich was entirely appropriate. The state court did not have jurisdiction over the third-party claim,
and removal could not create jurisdiction over that claim. The Tenth Circuit properly ruled that a judicial economy argument supporting a thirdparty claim cannot cure a defect in subject-matter jurisdiction. Thus, the
derivative jurisdiction principle applies to third-party claims as well as to
main actions.
B.

Limiting the Permz'ssble Groundsfor Remand to State Court

After removal, a district court must remand a case back to state court at
any time prior to final judgment if the case appears to have been "removed
improvidently and without jurisdiction."' 6 0 Until 1976, the general rule was
no appellate review of district court remand orders. 161 The nonreviewability
150. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1982). See 701 F.2d at 130.
151. 701 F.2d at 130.
152. Id See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982).
153. 701 F.2d at 130.
154. Id Because the federal district court did not have jurisdiction over the primary claim
of negligence, and did not acquire jurisdiction over the federal claim, the question of pendent
jurisdiction over the primary claim was not considered.
155. Id Dismissal of the third-party claims means Burlington must now bring its indemnity
and contribution claim against the United States as a separate cause of action in federal court.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982).
156. FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a). Rule 14(a) allows a defendant to implead a third party who is
or may be liable to the defendant for all or part of the original plaintiffs claim. Id
157. 701 F.2d at 130.
158. 512 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1972).
159. Id at 893. "Permission" means that although Rule 14(a), for example, does not require third party impleader, a court in its discretion may allow the impleader. There is nothing
4
in Rule 1 (a) conferring jurisdiction, and therefore it should not be construed as a source of
jurisdiction. See FED. R. Civ. P. 82.
160. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (1982).
161. See Myers, supra note 146, at 743. This rule originates from 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (1982)
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rule was intended to prevent delays and interruptions of the proceedings in a
case. 16 2 Then, in Thermtron Products, Inc., v. Hermansdorfer,163 the Supreme
Court relaxed the harshness of this rule by holding that a remand order for a
properly removed case may be reviewed when the remand is based on
grounds not authorized by statute. ' 64 The Tenth Circuit applied this rule of
law when it granted a writ of mandamus in Sheet Metal Workers International
Assoctaton v. Seal.165
Sheet Metal Workers was commenced in Oklahoma state court, and involved an alleged breach of a collective bargaining agreement.' 66 The case
was properly removed to the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Oklahoma because federal district courts have original jurisdiction over actions involving collective bargaining agreements. 16 7 The federal
district court then granted the employer's motion to remand the case to state
69
court.168 The case was not remanded upon statutory grounds, however.1
Applying Thermtron, the Tenth Circuit granted the requested writ of mandamus and ordered the district court to vacate the remand order and hear the
case. 170
The Tenth Circuit's decision rejected the three arguments raised by the
employer (Acme). First, Acme argued that the mandamus proceeding was
barred because of the statutory prohibition against appellate review of remand orders.' t7 Citing Thermtron, the Tenth Circuit responded that a remand decision is reviewable when it is based on grounds not specified by
statute. 17 2 Because the statute, 28 U.S.C. § 144 7 (c), 173 permits remand only
when removal is "improvident and without jurisdiction," and those were not
the grounds proffered by the district court, appellate review was not
74
barred. 1
Second, Acme attempted to distinguish Thermtron by pointing out that
the word "improvidently" is not defined. Therefore, respondent Acme conwhich reads in relevant part: "An order remanding a case to the State court from which it was
removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise." The statute provides an exception for remand orders in civil rights cases. Id
162. Myers, supra note 146, at 742 (citing Chandler v. O'Bryan, 445 F.2d 1045, 1057 (10th
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 964 (1972)).
163. 423 U.S. 336 (1976).
164. Id. at 351. The statutory basis for remand is set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (1982).
165. 693 F.2d 1000 (10th Cir. 1982), modifitd, 696 F.2d 780 (10th Cir. 1983). The court
modified its original decision to allow the district court to determine whether it would entertain
pendent state claims. 696 F.2d at 783.
166. 693 F.2d at 1001.
167. See Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a)
(1982). Removal of original jurisdiction actions is authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1982).
168. 693 F.2d at 1001.
169. Concurrent jurisdiction existed between the state and federal court. The injunctive
relief requested by the employer could not be granted by the federal court, see Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-114 (1982), but was a possible remedy in state court. 693 F.2d at
1001. The district court remanded because it felt the state court's power to grant complete relief
made that court a better forum. Id at 1002 n.2.
170. 693 F.2d at 1006.
171. Id at 1002. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (1982).
172. 693 F.2d at 1002.
173. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (1982).
174. 693 F.2d at 1001-02.
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tended, the definition of "improvidently" removed should include situations
in which removal would limit the available remedies. 175 The Tenth Circuit
disagreed, stating that the presence of restricted remedies in federal court
does not compel a remand. Disparity in remedies is just one of the hardships
76
incurred when federal jurisdiction is properly invoked.1
Third, Acme contended that the case had been "improvidently removed." For this argument to stand, however, Acme was required to show a
procedural defect. 1 77 Because the case had been timely removed and contained no other procedural defects, it had not been "improvidently removed" and appellate review was proper.' 78 Restricted remedies did not
violate a procedural requirement, and consequently could not affect the cir79
cuit court's jurisdiction.'
After rejecting Acme's arguments the Tenth Circuit concluded that the
restricted availability of remedies is not a statutory ground for remand back
to a state court.' 80 Consequently, the court was required to grant the requested mandamus.'
The fact that the court felt compelled to grant the
mandamus indicates that district courts are no longer free to remand for
reasons not specified by statutes.
C.

Limil'ng "Federal Quest'on" Removal

Another general rule in removal jurisdiction is that removal statutes are
to be strictly construed.' 8 2 The Tenth Circuit applied this rule in Fajen v.
Foundation Reserve Insurance Co. ,183 where it considered whether the federal
district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (b),18 4 which permits removal of cases involving federal questions. 185
A brief recital of the complex procedural history behind Fajen is necessary for an understanding of the court's decision. Five years after the plain175. Id at 1003. Acme was seeking injunctive relief which a federal court could not grant
but a state court could. See supra note 169.
176. See 693 F.2d at 1004 (quoting Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, Int'l Assoc. of Machinists, 390 U.S. 557, 561 (1968)). The Tenth Circuit noted that the solution to the problem of
restricted remedies lies with Congress. 693 F.2d at 1004.
177. 693 F.2d at 1005. See generally Note, supra note 145, at 1093 (concludes improvidently
means legally defective). But cf Young v. Board of Educ., 416 F. Supp. 1139, 1141 (D. Colo.
7
1976) (without mentioning section 144 (c), the district court remanded a properly removed case
because either state or federal court could hear civil rights actions and the plaintiff's choice of
forum should be protected).
178. See 693 F.2d at 1005 (failing to find procedural defect).
179. Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, Int'l Assoc. of Machinists, 390 U.S. 557, 561 (1968).
180. 693 F.2d at 1005-06.
181. Id. at 1006.
182. See,e.g., Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100 (1941); Chicago, R.I. &
P.R. Co. v. Stude. 204 F.2d 116 (8th Cir. 1953), aJ'd, 346 U.S. 574 (1954).
183. 683 F.2d 331 (10th Cir. 1982).
184. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1982). This section reads:
Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded on
a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States
shall be removable without regard to the citizenship or residence of the parties. Any
other such action shall be removable only if none of the parties in interest properly
joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the state in which such action is
brought.
Id.
185. 683 F.2d at 333.
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tiff had obtained a default judgment in a Nevada state court, the plaintiff
filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico
to recover the unsatisfied judgment. 186 The district court refused to enforce
the judgment; instead, it granted summary judgment for the defendant because the record in the earlier action indicated that the plaintiff had failed to
comply with Nevada's requirements for substituted service of process.187
Consequently, the Nevada court had not had personal jurisdiction over the
defendant in the earlier action, and the default judgment was unenforceable.188 The plaintiff then returned to Nevada and obtained an amended
default judgment nunc pro tunc, which corrected the personal jurisdiction
problem.' 8 9 Plaintiff then instituted an action in a New Mexico state court
seeking to enforce the amended Nevada judgment.190 Defendant requested
removal to federal district court, which the United States District Court for
the District of New Mexico granted to protect its prior summary judgment
decision.' 9' Instead of treating plaintiff's suit on the nunc pro tunc judgment separately, however, the district court consolidated it with the prior
grant of summary judgment for the defendant and characterized the consolidated action as a Rule 60(b)19 2 motion to vacate the grant of summary judgment. 193 The hybrid motion was then denied, and the action was
dismissed. 194
On appeal the issue was whether jurisdiction existed to permit removal. 195 The majority held that removal was improper, and ordered the
case remanded to state court.1 96 The starting point for the majority's analysis was the rule that removal jurisdiction statutes must be strictly construed. 19 7 In Fajen, the majority found that the district court was more
concerned with protecting its prior summary judgment than with applying
the Tenth Circuit's standard for removal based on a federal question.' 98
Two reasons were given for reversing the trial court's assumption of
jurisdiction.
First, plaintiff's action on the judgment nunc pro tunc was not a collateral attack on the federal court's grant of summary judgment because the
issues involved in the two actions were markedly different. 199 The issue in
the summary judgment proceeding was limited to determining whether the
186.
187.
188.
189.

Id at 332.
Id.
Set id at 333.
Id

190. Id.

191. Id.
192. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Rule 60(b) permits motions to vacate a prior judgment.
193. 683 F.2d at 333.
194. Id
195. Id
196. Id at 334. Chief Judge Seth dissented from this decision. Id (Seth, C.J., dissenting).
197. Id at 333 (citing Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108-09 (1941)).
198. 683 F.2d at 333. The standard to be met is that "the required federal right or immunity must be an essential element of the plaintiff's cause of action, and . . . that federal controversy must be disclosed upon the face of the complaint, unaided by the answer or by the
petition for removal." Madsen v. Prudential Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n. 635 F.2d 797. 800 (10th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1018 (1981), quoted in Fajen, 683 F.2d at 333.
199. 683 F.2d at 334.
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Nevada state court had jurisdiction to enter the original default judgment. 200 The issue in the disputed proceeding on the judgment nunc pro
tunc, however, was whether Nevada could cure the jurisdictional defect after
the fact. 2 0 1 Consequently, the prior judgment was not at issue in the second
suit, and the court had no jurisdiction to grant a removal petition to protect
20 2
its previous judgment.
Second, to the extent that the federal summary judgment order was
implicated in the second proceeding, it was implicated only by way of defense.2 0 3 The majority stated that the basis for federal question removal
must appear on the face of a complaint. 2 4 Where the complaint was predicated on state grounds, the fact that the suit might ultimately involve construction of a prior federal judgment did not convert the suit into an action
involving a federal question. 20 5 Hence, removal under section 1441(b) was
20 6
improper.
Chief Judge Seth, in dissent, presented the two issues on appeal as first,
whether plaintiff's motion to remand the action to state court was properly
2
denied, and second whether the Rule 60(b) motion was properly denied . 07
Chief Judge Seth declared strongly that the action on the nunc pro tunc
judgment directly attacked the district court's grant of summary judgment
because the nunc pro tunc proceeding was in essence an attempt to obtain
relief from a federal judgment.20 8 Thus, the remand was properly denied,
because protecting a prior decision presented a federal question under the
Fifth Circuit's Villarreal v. Brown Express, Inc. 209 decision. The plaintiff
should not be allowed to circumvent the prior federal court dismissal by
correcting the defect supporting the dismissal; rather, the earlier federal
210
judgment was entitled to protection in subsequent actions.
The dissent also abjured the majority's use of a well-pleaded complaint
rule. The duty of the court was to go beyond the facts of the complaint and
look for a controlling question of federal law. 2 1 , If the majority had done so,
they would have found a federal question, 21 2 and therefore would have sustained jurisdiction upon removal. 2 13 Given jurisdiction, the dissent would
200. Id
201. Id
202. Id
203. Id
204. Id See supra note 198.
205. Id Cf Louisville & Nashville kR. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908) (no federal question
jurisdiction based on a "lurking" federal defense).
206. 683 F.2d at 334.
207. Id at 335 (Seth, C.J., dissenting).
208. Id. at 336.
209. 529 F.2d 1219 (5th Cir. 1976). In Vzllarreal, the plaintiff had settled a personal injury
claim for $300,000 in federal district court, and the action was dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiff later brought a state court action against the defendant, claiming that the federal award was
inadequate because the defendant had converted key evidence. The Fifth Circuit held that
federal question removal was proper to protect the existing federal judgment. Id at 1220-21.
210. 683 F.2d at 336 (Seth, C.J., dissenting).
211. Id at 335.
212. See supra notes 208-10 and accompanying text.
213. 683 F.2d at 335-36 (Seth, C.J., dissenting).
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2
have affirmed the district court's denial of the Rule 60(b) motion.
Despite the strong dissent, the decision in Fajen limits the rule articulated in Villarreal. Unless a prior federal judgment is a material part of a
subsequent action, protecting that prior judgment is an insufficient basis for
federal question removal in the Tenth Circuit.

D.

RetazrtngJury Trial Rights After Removal

The question of when a state right to a jury trial is retained upon re2 15
was addressed in City of Aurora v.
moval pursuant to section 1442(a)(1)
217
2 16
in which Erwin, a
City of Aurora involved a petty offense action
Erwin.
United States postman, argued that he had an absolute right to a jury trial
2 9
under state law 2 ' 8 and that this right was retained upon removal. ' Applying a two-part analysis, a Tenth Circuit panel majority determined that Er220
First, the Tenth
win's right to a jury trial was retained following removal.
Circuit noted that removal cannot supplant substantive state law, but that
22
federal procedural rules preempt conflicting state rules. ' Next, the court
concluded that the Colorado statute providing for a jury trial was nonprocedural in character,2 2 2 and that this right was therefore retained upon
removal.
In reaching the court's conclusion, Judge McKay, writing for the majority, considered the limited purpose behind section 1442(a)(1). Citing Arizona
v. Manypenny, 223 Judge McKay stated that section 1442(a)(1) was intended
to permit a federal officer to assert immunity defenses in a forum free from
local interests and prejudices.22 4 Removal jurisdiction could "neither en225
Therefore, state law applies
large nor contract the rights of the parties."
226
unless it is preempted by a federal procedural rule.
Next, Judge McKay considered whether the Colorado statute providing
jury trials in criminal petty offense actions was enacted for procedural or
nonprocedural reasons. Although this determination was a federal question,
the court observed that a state's purpose in granting the jury trial right is a
227
Probing into the hissignificant factor in arriving at a final conclusion.
the
court concluded that
trial,
ajury
for
tory of the state statutory provision
214. Id at 336.
215. 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) (1982). This section permits removal to a federal court when
the action is brought against a United States officer, or an agent of such officer, concerning an
act within the scope of his or her office. Id
216. 706 F.2d 295 (10th Cir. 1983).
217. The postman was charged with a petty offense after spraying a dog's owner with dog
repellant. The offense took place on the "doggiest route in Aurora." Id at 295 n.j.
218. Id at 295. The defendant was entitled to a jury trial under Colorado law. See COLO.
REV. STAT. § 16-10-109(2) (1978).

219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
296-97.
226.
227.

706 F.2d at 296.
Id at 299.
Id at 296-97.
Id at 298-99.
451 U.S. 232 (1981).
706 F.2d at 296.
Arizona v. Manypenny, 451 U.S. 232, 242 (1981), quoted n) City of Aurora, 706 F.2d at
706 F.2d at 297. See also 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982).
706 F.2d at 297.
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the right was created as a direct response to the Colorado Supreme Court
decision in Austin v. City of Denver.228 In Austzn, the state supreme court ruled
that the right to a jury trial did not extend to petty criminal offenses.
Shortly thereafter, the legislature enacted a statute granting such jury trial
rights.229 Since its enactment, the Colorado Supreme Court has characterized the statute as creating a substantive right, 230 albeit without articulation
of a nonprocedural rationale to support that characterization. Judge McKay concluded that the jury trial right had been enacted, at least in part, for
nonprocedural reasons, and therefore the right was retained as state substan2 3t
tive law upon removal to the federal court under section 1442(a)(1).
In the dissenting opinion, Chief Judge Seth criticized the majority's
conclusion that Erwin was entitled to a jury trial in federal court. Chief
Judge Seth's primary argument was that "state laws cannot alter the essential character or functions of a federal court. ' 232 He reasoned that because a
federal magistrate court does not hold jury trials for petty criminal offenses,
the majority's decision alters this fundamental characteristic of the magistrate court. 233 The dissent concluded that, although the policy behind the
Colorado law was relevant in assessing the rule's importance, it should not
dictate the determination of what constituted a substantive right in a federal
234
court.
Because the majority's decision altered the federal distribution of
functions between judge and jury in the absence of convincing evidence of
the substantive nature of the state jury trial right, Chief Judge Seth
dissented.
IV.

MULTIPLE CLAIMS AND FINALITY UNDER RULE

54(b)

A basic policy in federal courts is that an appeal will lie only from a
final decision. 235 A slight variation of that policy is provided in Rule
54(b) .236 Rule 54(b) allows particular orders which are not dispositive of an
entire action to be treated as final and, therefore, reviewable. 237 The usual
228. 170 Colo. 448, 462 P.2d 600, cert. denied, 398 U.S. 910 (1970). See 706 F.2d at 298.
229. 706 F.2d at 298. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-10-109(2) (1978).
230. Garcia v. People, 200 Colo. 413, 615 P.2d 698 (1980); Hardamon v. Municipal Court,
178 Colo. 271, 497 P.2d 1000 (1972).
231. 706 F.2d at 299.
232. Id. at 300 (Seth, C.J., dissenting). As supporting authority, the chief judge cited two
diversity jurisdiction cases, Byrd v Blue Ridge Coop., 356 U.S. 525 (1958) and Herron v.Southern Pac. Co., 283 U.S. 91 (1931). 706 F.2d at 299. The majority distinguished these cases
because they were diversity cases, not section 1442(a)(1) actions, and therefore invoked different
policy considerations, Id. at 299 n.10. In addition, the majority offered three other rebuttal
arguments: Byrd concerned a seventh amendment, not a sixth amendment, jury right; like Bryd,
City fAurora furthered the federal policy of promoting jury trials; and, finally, Byrd has been
subject to controversy. Id
233. 706 F.2d at 300 (Seth, C.J., dissenting).
234. Id.
235. See supra notes 1-8 and accompanying text.
236. FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b). Rule 54(b) reads in pertinent part:
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action . . .or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or
more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination
that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of
judgment.
237. See id
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problem with Rule 54(b) is determining which trial court decisions are final.
In this past term, the Tenth Circuit considered this question in light of the
requirements and purposes of Rule 54(b).

A.

PartialDamage Awards Are Not Final Under 54(b)

In the per curiam decision Wheeler Machineiy Co. v. Mountain States Mineral
Enterprises, Inc. ,238 the Tenth Circuit held that a partial summary judgment,
awarding only a portion of the damages claimed, is not a final judgment for
purposes of Rule 54(b). 239 The district court in Wheeler granted partial summary judgment for the minimum undisputed amount Mountain States owed
Wheeler under a contract, and declared that judgment final under Rule
54(b). 24 0 The Tenth Circuit dismissed Mountain States' appeal, concluding
that the partial summary judgment was not final within the meaning of
24
Rule 54(b). 1
In determining whether the damages judgment was final, the Tenth
Circuit relied on the definition of a Rule 54(b) final judgment set forth in the
Supreme Court decisions Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey 2 4 2 and Curtiss-Wright
Corp. o. GeneralElectric Co. 243 Sears defined final judgment under Rule 54(b)
as the ultimate disposition of one claim among several claims. 24 4 An "ultimate disposition" must meet the finality requirements of section 1291 even
though it encompasses fewer than all the claims in an action. 24 5 The district
court cannot, by certifying a decision as final, change the inherent nature of
that decision. 246 Once finality is found, a Rule 54(b) appeal is permitted if
24 7
the district court determines that there is no just reason for delay.
In Wheeler, the partial summary judgment for damages left other damage claims arising from the same breach-interest, attorney fees, disputed
principal-undetermined. The Tenth Circuit applied the rule, followed by
other circuit courts, 2 4 8 that where a principal amount is awarded but an
interest claim has yet to be determined, the award is not final for purposes of
24 9
appellate review.
238. 696 F.2d 787 (10th Cir. 1983) (per curiam).
239. Id. at 789.
240. Id
241. Id
242. 351 U S. 427 (1956). The Supreme Court held that Rule 54(b) is important for permitting timely appeals of adjudicated issues before all the issues in an action are determined. Id. at
437.
243. 446 U.S. 1 (1980).
244. 351 U.S. at 436, quoted t Curtiss-Wright Corp., 446 U.S. at 7.
245. 351 U.S. at 438.
246. Id. at 437.
247. 446 U.S. at 8. The district court acts as a dispatcher, determining when Rule 54(b)
certification is appropriate.
248. See Memphis Sheraton Corp. v. Kirkley, 614 F.2d 131, 131-32 (6th Cir. 1980); Acha v.
Beame, 570 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 1978); Cinerama, Inc. v. Sweet Music, S.A., 482 F.2d 66, 69 (2d
Cir. 1973).
249. 696 F.2d at 789. The court also noted that a dispute over a portion of the principal
precludes finality. Id
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Rule 54(b) Fnaht and Class Action Damage Awards

In Strey v. Hunt InternationalResources Corp.,250 the Tenth Circuit also concluded that a damage award was not final and therefore not reviewable
under Rule 54(b). 25 1 Strey was a class action in which the district court rendered a damage award without providing a method for dividing the fund
among class members, for disposing of unclaimed shares, and for assessing
attorney fees against the common fund. 252 The Tenth Circuit cited Boeing
Co. v. Van Gemert 25 3 as supporting the rule that the absence of a formula for
dividing the damage award created a lack of final judgment, and dismissed
2 54
the appeal.
C.

Rule 54(b) Certifxation Merges with Previous Orders to Create Final
Judgment

A notice of appeal must be filed within thirty days of an order or judgment in a civil action. 255 The timely filing of the notice of appeal is a condition precedent to appellate jurisdiction over the appeal. 256 The Tenth
Circuit adheres strictly to this rule.2 57 A prerequisite to appeal is a final
order.2 5 8 If the appeal is under Rule 54(b), the district court must expressly
determine that the partial judgment is final, and must direct entry of judgWithout such certification, even a timely appeal is not
ment. 259
26 °
reviewable.
In A. 0. Smith Corp. v. Sims Consolidated, Ltd. 261 the Tenth Circuit held
that a Rule 54(b) certification merges with a prior order disposing of a claim,
and constitutes the final judgment for purposes of the thirty-day period for
filing a notice of appeal. 26 2 Garden City Production Credit Association v. Interna250. 696 F.2d 87 (10th Cir. 1982). In another class action case, the Tenth Circuit held that
an order which did not address the merits of the claim was not appealable under Rule 54(b).
See Baker v. Bray, 701 F.2d 119 (10th Cir. 1983).
251. 696 F.2d at 88.
252. Id
253. 444 U.S. 472 (1980).
254. 696 F.2d at 88. See 444 U.S. at 481 n.7.
255. FED. R. App. P. 4(a)(l). The thirty-day rule is subject to exceptions, such as interlocutory appeals under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1982) and certain bankruptcy appeals.
256. Gooch v. Skelly Oil Co., 493 F.2d 366, 368 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 997 (1974)
(timeliness is mandatory and jurisdictional).
257. The Tenth Circuit's strict adherence to the filing rule is represented by several opinions, not selected for routine publication, issuing this past term and dismissing cases for untimely appeals. See, e.g., Boyd v. Shawnee Mission Pub. Schools, No. 82-1699 (10th Cir., Mar. 3,
1983); Robinson v. Audi NSU Auto Union, No. 82-1680 (10th Cir., Feb. 28, 1983); Myers v.
Utah State Adult Probation & Parole Dept., No. 82-2171 (10th Cir., Dec. 13, 1982); United
States v. Daniels, No. 82-2071 (10th Cir., Dec. 8, 1982); St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. v. Scott
Fertilizer Co., No. 82-1510, No. 82-1561 (10th Cir., Oct. 27, 1982); United States v. Clayton, No.
82-1482 (10th Cir., Oct. 22, 1982); American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Resource Technology Corp.,
No. 82-1492 (10th Cir., Aug. 27, 1982); Herron v. Pendleton, Sabian & Craft. No. 82-1200 (10th
Cir., Aug. 3, 1982); United States v. Afflerbach, No. 82-1667 (10th Cir., July 29, 1982).
258. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982).
259. FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b). Accord Golden Villa Spa, Inc. v. Health Indus., Inc., 549 F.2d
1363, 1364 (10th Cir. 1977). Seealso United States v. Taylor, 632 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1980) (if no
certificate of finality is issued, then appeal under Rule 54(b) should be dismissed).
260. Golden Villa Spa, Inc. v. Health Indus., Inc., 549 F.2d 1363 (10th Cir. 1977).
261. 647 F.2d 118 (10th Cir. 1981).
262. Id at 121.
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allowed the Tenth Circuit to reaffirm its holding in

The issue in Garden City was whether the court had jurisdiction over an
appeal and cross-appeal filed prior to a Rule 54(b) certification. The district
court had granted a partial summary judgment against only one defendant,
International Cattle Systems (ICS), on November 20, 1981.264 On January
7, 1982, that judgment was adjusted for interest due. 2 65 On February 24,
1982, the district court denied ICS's motion for reconsideration of the judgment.2 66 A notice of appeal was filed by ICS on March 25, 1982, and another defendant cross-appealed on April 7, 1982.267 Because the summary
judgment was only partial, ICS then requested certification of its appeal
under Rule 54(b); the district court issued the Rule 54(b) certificate on April
13, 1982.268

As the facts illustrate, ICS's notice of appeal was filed more than thirty
days after the November 20 order and the January 7 order but prior to the
Rule 54(b) certification. In determining its jurisdiction over the appeals, the
Tenth Circuit answered two questions. First, the Tenth Circuit held the
orders on summary judgment and interest were not final because not all of
the parties' rights and liabilities were adjudicated. 269 Thus, jurisdiction over
the original appeals was defective. Next, the Tenth Circuit considered
whether the Rule 54(b) certification cured the jurisdictional defects in the
notices of appeal. Relying on A. 0. Staih, the court held that the Rule 54(b)
certification did not cure the defects; rather, the certification merged with
the prior orders to create a final judgment. 2 70 The notices of appeals pursuant to the original summary judgment orders were ruled premature, and the
court would therefore have been required to dismiss the appeals except that
a second set of appeal notices had been timely filed following the certification order. 2 71 Garden City reaffirms the holding ofA. 0. Smith and further
emphasizes the importance of filing a timely notice of appeal.
IV.

COLLATERAL ORDER EXCEPTION TO FINALITY

Collateral orders are orders incidental to the primary action, and are
exceptions to the final decision rule for appellate jurisdiction. Regardless of
the status of the primary action, such orders are immediately appealable as
final decisions provided certain factors are present. 272 The Tenth Circuit
263. No. 82-1387 (10th Cir., July 30, 1982).
264. Id. at 2.
265. Id
266. Id at 4.
267. Id.
268. Id
269. Id
270. d.
271. Id. at 4-5. The court considered this second notice of appeal to be properly filed. Id. at
4-5.
272. The collateral order exception concerns orders "which finally determine claims of right
separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred
until the whole case is adjudicated." Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp. 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949).
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considered these factors, and their application in the context of a claim of
273
absolute governmental immunity, in Chavez v. Sziger.
In Chavez, a federal government firefighter brought a tort action in federal district court against his supervisor, claiming that he had been injured
as a result of his supervisor's negligent instructions. 2 74 The district court
granted partial summary judgment denying the supervisor's asserted defense
of absolute immunity.2 75 The supervisor appealed this decision, claiming ap2 76
pellate jurisdiction existed under the collateral order exception.
The four elements to be met before a collateral order exception will lie
are: 1) the appeal must be from an order conclusively resolving a disputed
question; 2) the question resolved must be collateral to and separate from the
merits of the action; 3) the question must be effectively unreviewable on
appeal from a final judgment; and 4) the appeal must present a serious and
unsettled question.2 77 The Tenth Circuit found the collateral order doctrine
applicable by analogizing the absolute immunity issue to the double jeopardy issue presented to the Supreme Court in Abney v. United Slates.2 7 3 The
Tenth Circuit recognized that, like the double jeopardy issue, the absolute
immunity issue should be addressed before trial because it determines
whether the supervisor could be "haled into court" and would therefore not
be subject to meaningful review.2 79 Similarly, the question of immunity was
distinct from the merits and was a serious and unsettled question. 280 Finally, the district court's ruling on the issue was conclusive. 2 1 The court
therefore concluded that the immunity question was collateral to the main
action; finding the appeal proper under the collateral order exception, the
28 2
Tenth Circuit discussed the merits and affirmed the district court's ruling.
V.

STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR SPECIAL MASTER'S RECOMMENDATION

Judges must be alert to the possibility that a jury may have reached a
compromise verdict. 2 3 A judge cannot question a jury's deliberative process, but the judge's suspicion should be aroused when there is a close question on liability and the damage award is extremely inadequate.2 8 4 If it is
determined a compromise verdict was reached, then the judge should recom273. 698 F.2d 420 (10th Cir. 1983).
274. Id at 421.

275. Id
276. Id
277. Id The first three elements were set forth by the Supreme Court in Coopers & Lybrand
v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978). The final element was recognized in Nixon v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 731, 742-43 (1982) (citing Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 547 (1949)).
278. 431 U.S. 651 (1977).
279. 698 F.2d at 421. Set also 431 U.S. at 659.
280. 698 F.2d at 421.
281. d.
282. Id at 421-22.
283. A compromise verdict is reached when some jurors surrender their view on a material
issue in return for similar action by other jurors on another issue, resulting in a verdict which is
not shared by the jury. A common source for compromise verdicts is a disagreement on liability. Liability will be found, but only a small award of damages is given. See, e.g., Lucas v.
American Mfg. Co., 630 F.2d 291, 294 (5th Cir. 1980); Young v. International Paper Co., 322
F.2d 820, 823 (4th Cir. 1963).
284. See supra note 283.
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mend a new trial. This was the problem presented in NationalRailroadPassenger Corp. v. Koch Industries, Inc. 285
The jury in National Railroad returned a verdict finding the defendant
ninety-nine per cent negligent and the plaintiff one per cent negligent, yet
awarded damages only equaling what the plaintiff had paid third parties
and ignoring the actual losses the plaintiff suffered. 28 6 Noting that liability
was a hotly contested issue and that the defendant did not contest plaintiffs
damages, the special master concluded that the jury had reached a compromise verdict and recommended a new trial. 28 7 Without reviewing the transcript, the district court judge rejected the special master's recommendation
and ordered a new trial limited to the issue of damages. 288 The issues
presented to the Tenth Circuit were the degree of deference the district court
judge should give the special master's recommendation, and the degree of
deference the Tenth Circuit should give to the district court judge's decision.
Addressing the first issue, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the abuseof-discretion test should apply to its review of the district court's decision to
reject the master's findings. 2 9 The Tenth Circuit recognized that if the trial
judge alone had determined that a compromise verdict was reached and had
ordered a new trial, or if the trial judge alone had ordered a new trial on
damages, a circuit court would uphold the decision unless the record indicated an abuse of discretion. 29° The decision to grant a new trial based on
the master's findings was entitled to similar deferential review. 29 '
The Tenth Circuit then noted that a district court could abuse its discretion by failing to apply the proper standard of review to a master's recommendation. 2 92 When reviewing a masters's recommendation, a de novo
determination was required, which meant that the district court could place
293
whatever reliance it chose to on the special master's recommendations.
The district court, however, could not summarily ignore a recommendation
based primarily upon credibility; rejecting such a recommendation without
reviewing the record was an abuse of discretion. 294 The Tenth Circuit concluded that a finding of a compromise verdict was similar to a finding based
on credibility, because the master's subjective impression of the trial was intimately tied to the conclusion that there had been a "hotly contested" issue
285. 701 F.2d 108 (10th Cir. 1983). A magistrate conducted the proceedings in the district
court as a special master pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(2) (1982). 701 F.2d at 109. Section
636(b)(2) allows special master proceedings "upon consent of the parties, without regard to the
provisions of rule 53(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." Therefore, the limitations of
Rule 53(b) (requiring the reference to a master to be the exception rather than the rule) need
not be considered.
286. 701 F.2d at 110.
287. The special master discovered "no rational connection between the verdict rendered
and the facts and evidence presented at the trial." Id.
288. Id at 112.
289. Id at 110-11.
290. Id
291. Id at 1ll.
292. Id
293. Id See also United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 674-75 (1980) (holding that congressional intent behind requiring de novo review of magistrate's findings required "sound exercise of judicial discretion," not a new hearing).
294. 701 F.2d at Ill.
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of liability. 29 5 The trial court was therefore required to review the transcript
before rejecting the master's recommendation. 296 Because the trial court
had failed to do so in National Railroad, it had abused its discretion; accordingly, the case was remanded for a decision based upon a review of the
transcript.
Miche L. Keisi

295. Id
296. Id

